Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe? by Issacharoff, Samuel & Miller, Geoffrey P.
Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 62 | Issue 1 Article 4
1-2009
Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?
Samuel Issacharoff
Geoffrey P. Miller
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Civil Law Commons
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by
an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Samuel Issacharoff and Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?, 62 Vanderbilt Law Review 177 (2019)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol62/iss1/4
Will Aggregate Litigation
Come to Europe?
Samuel Issacharoff
Geoffrey P. Miller 62 Vand. L. Rev. 179 (2009)
This Essay considers Europe's experiment with aggregate
litigation in light of American experience. European thinking on the
topic appears to have reached consensus on two points: first,
aggregate litigation will soon be the norm for Europe; and second,
whatever form European aggregate litigation takes, it will not
replicate American class action litigation with its domination by
entrepreneurial plaintiffs' attorneys. We first examine four sources of
dissatisfaction with the class action to assess which are meritorious,
which are ill-founded, and which derive from a deeper debate over
whether or not there should be private legal accountability for
consumer claims. Drawing on America's long history of collective
enforcement, we then ask whether Europe will adopt the incentives
and institutional arrangements necessary to make aggregate
litigation an effective remedy. Our concern is that Europe's revulsion
at accepting the reality of legal enforcement as an entrepreneurial
activity may leave the incipient reforms without the necessary agents
of implementation.
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The current wave of deregulation and market liberalization in
Europe has had major repercussions for the prospect of litigated forms
of collective redress. Once decried as the perversity of rapacious
Americans, class actions are now the focus of significant reform efforts
in many European countries and even at the level of the European
Union. There are, no doubt, many reasons for the relatively sudden
attention to means of collective redress. Some have to do with the need
to create effective ex post accountability mechanisms to contain the
potential adverse effects of goods and services freely entering the
market. Others seek to create mechanisms for efficient resolution of
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the numerous intertwined claims that invariably arise from the mass
production and delivery of goods and services across a broad market.
One should not gainsay the significance of these reform
measures. All represent efforts to mobilize means of private
enforcement to prevent harm through the prospect of civil litigation.
For countries steeped in the civil law tradition, the move away from
centralized public enforcement is a sea change in legal structures. The
marriage of private enforcement mechanisms and relaxed barriers to
entry into increasingly deregulated markets is a significant change as
well. Add to that the diversity of litigation tools that are being
developed and one would have to be almost churlish not to marvel at
the liberalizing spirit sweeping the continent.
And, yet, one need spend only a few minutes in conversations
with European reformers before the proverbial "but" enters the
discourse: "But, of course, we shall not have American-style class
actions." At this point, all participants nod sagely, confident that
collective actions, representative actions, group actions, and a host of
other aggregative arrangements can bring all the benefits of fair and
efficient resolution to disputes without the dreaded world of American
entrepreneurial lawyering. And no doubt the American
entrepreneurial ways must and will be resisted fully, in much the
same way that Europe has held off the unwelcome presence of
McDonald's or Starbucks in its elegant piazzas. To this dignified and
self-assured conversation we bring a simple but unwelcome question:
Really?
We develop this Essay in two parts. First, we must
acknowledge that the aversion to the American-style class action
corresponds to sustained critiques of class actions in the United States
as well. A number of American reforms, from revisions to the class
action provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the Class
Action Fairness Act, have taken aim at some of the misfirings of class
actions. Some Supreme Court decisions, most notably Amchem
Products, Inc. v. Windsor1 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,2 have
burdened class actions with procedural strictures that have limited
the class action as an effective vehicle for resolution of mass personal
injuries. Thus, in the United States, broad scale settlements of
asbestos exposures or of pharmaceutical injuries are likely to take the
form of bankruptcy workouts, or mass private aggregative
1. 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (decertifying class settlement of asbestos claims).
2. 527 U.S. 815, 830 (1999) (same).
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settlements, as with the claims over harms caused by the anti-
inflammatory drug, Vioxx. 3
In this first Section, we examine four sources of claimed
dissatisfaction with the class action to assess which are meritorious,
which are ill-founded, and which derive from a deeper contest over
whether or not there should be private legal accountability for low
value or negative value consumer claims.
We then move on to draw certain conclusions from the
American experience with collective actions to ask whether the proper
incentives and institutional arrangements exist in the European
reform efforts. Our aim here is not to advocate that American
processes be adopted; neither of us sets foot in McDonald's or
Starbucks when in Europe.4 Rather, our inquiry is whether, based on
some of the lessons that may be derived from both the American
experience and the simple economics of incentive systems, the current
European reforms are likely to be effective in realizing their stated
aims. Our concern is that an apparent cultural revulsion at accepting
the reality of legal enforcement as entrepreneurial activity may leave
the reforms without the necessary agents of implementation.
I. WHITHER AMERICA
At some level, the striking feature of current developments in
aggregative practices is the apparent convergence between
significantly different legal systems.5 Increasingly, the concerns over
efficient use of the courts, limits on anticipatory regulation, and the
cost barriers to consumer claims have all pushed toward broader
experimentation with various forms of collective law enforcement. At
the same time, the extent of American liberalization of private
enforcement divides the continents. So, as American commentators, it
is perhaps best for us to begin by acknowledging the serious critiques
leveled domestically against American class actions and to ground the
European aversion to excess Americanism in those debates.
We will not rehash the basic arguments about why collective
means of aggregating claims are necessary. We have both addressed
3. The settlement agreement is available at http://www.merck.com/newsroom/vioxx/pdf/
Settlement Agreement.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2009).
4. One of us (Miller) confesses that he wishes to do so from time to time.
5. Richard Nagareda discusses this convergence in his Article in this volume. See Richard
A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation Across the Atlantic and the Future of American
Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2009).
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these issues in many prior writings.6 We both are deeply involved-
one of us as a Reporter, the other as an Advisor-in the efforts of the
American Law Institute to articulate the broader principles governing
aggregate litigation. Instead, we want to address ourselves here to
four distinct arguments raised in the American context over the
further reaches, or perhaps excesses, of class-wide litigation.
Our focus will be on four features of class or aggregated
litigation that are most at issue currently in the United States: first,
the scope of settlement possible on a noncontractual basis; second, the
limited nature of the recovery to potential class members; third, the
uneasy relation between entrepreneurialism and avarice; and, finally,
the manipulation of the judicial forum for litigation gain. We turn to
each of these as an introduction to our assessment of European
developments.
A. Mass Settlements
It is perhaps ironic that one of the features of American class
actions that most appeals to foreign legal systems-the efficiency of
mass resolution of common disputes-is also a source of problems at
home. Consider for example, the current trial of alleged securities
improprieties involving Deutsche Telekom, 7 the first test of the
German Capital Markets Model Case Act.8 The German statute allows
a representative case the authority to obtain controlling legal
principles for all similar claims. But the statute provides no
mechanism for enforcing the judgment for the non-represented
parties, and the law does not have any mechanism to create and
adjudge any proposed collective resolution. Thus, even were liability to
be determined in the test cases, there is no mechanism for the
6. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Group Litigation of Consumer Claims: Lessons of the
American Experience, 34 TEX. INT'L L.J. 135, 136 (1999) (discussing mechanisms for aggregating
consumer claims); Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 380-81
(2007) (highlighting the effectiveness of class actions in compensating victims of securities
fraud); Geoffrey P. Miller, Class Actions, in I NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND
THE LAW 257-62 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (explaining the economic rationale for class actions);
Geoffrey P. Miller & Jonathan R. Macey, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and
Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,
8-11 (1991) (same).
7. See DIETMAR BAETGE, CLASS ACTIONS, GROUP LITIGATION & OTHER FORMS OF
COLLECTIVE LITIGATION-GERMANY 8-9 (2007), available at http://globalclassactions.stanford.
eduIPDF/GermanyNationalReport.pdf (summarizing the Deutsche Telekom case).
8. Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz [Act on the Initiation of Model Case
Proceedings in Respect of Investors in the Capital Markets], Aug. 16, 2005, BGB1. I at 2437,
translated at http://www.bmj.bund.de/kapmug; see also BAETGE, supra note 7, at 12-13
(describing procedures established by Model Case Act).
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expeditious resolution of the remaining 16,000 claims of fraud.9 At the
other pole, the Dutch legislation that provides for enforceable class-
wide settlements °0 -an Act whose sweep is similarly being tested at
present in the proposed settlement of the non-U.S. claims in the Royal
Dutch Shell securities fraud litigation'-enables private parties to
impose a settlement without providing any corresponding mechanism
for collective trial. From the U.S. perspective, this appears to be an
invitation for weak agents to step forward as purveyors of suboptimal
peace agreements.
In the U.S. context, however, the last three major Supreme
Court decisions on class actions have all addressed the problematic
further reaches of mass settlement. In Matsushita Electrical
Industrial Co. v. Epstein, for example, the question was whether
lawyers representing a state court class in a securities fraud case
could agree to a class-wide settlement of federal securities claims over
which the state court had no jurisdiction-a mismatch between the
scope of settlement authority and representation for litigation, much
as now arises under the Dutch class action statute.' 2 Then, in Amchem
Products v. Windsor, the Court struck down a sweeping asbestos
settlement that would have exchanged compensation of current
injured claimants for a structured workout of future claimants. 13 The
latter group quite rightly exhibited "rational apathy," as well put by
Professor Jack Coffee,1 4 because the prospects of settlement were, for
9. See BAETGE, supra note 7, at 13 (explaining that after an appellate court conducts the
model case proceedings, a trial court decides all of the individual cases subject to the model
ruling); Laurel J. Harbour & Marc E. Shelley, The Emerging European Class Action: Expanding
Multi-Party Litigation to a Shrinking World, 18 PRAC. LITIGATOR 23, 29 (July 2007) ("Under the
Capital Markets Act, claimants must opt in and each must file an individual lawsuit."); Deutsch
Telekom: Bad Connection, ECONOMIST, Apr. 12, 2008, at 74, available at
http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id=l1021139 ("Even if the model
plaintiffs are ultimately successful, all the other claimants must then sue separately in a lower
court - a process which could take 20 years."); see also BAETGE, supra note 7, at 20 (noting that
"investors who have joined model proceedings at a later stage or have not brought a suit at all
are not bound by the model decision").
10. Burgerlijk Wetboek [BW] [Civil Code] arts. 3:305a-b; see IANIKA TZANKOVA & D.F.
LUNSINGH SCHEURLEER, CLASS ACTIONS, GROUP LITIGATION AND OTHER FORMS OF COLLECTIVE
LITIGATION DUTCH REPORT 7-9 (2007), available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/
images/dynamic/events-mediafNetherlandsNationalReport.pdf (summarizing the main
elements of the Dutch Act on Collective Settlements).
11. See Harbour & Shelley, supra note 9, at 28 (discussing collective settlement actions in
the Netherlands); ShellSettlement.com, http://www.shellsettlement.com/ (last visited Jan. 4,
2009) (providing information related to the proposed settlement).
12. 516 U.S. 367, 369 (1996).
13. 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997).
14. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in
Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 422 (2000).
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any particular individual at the time of settlement, a matter of remote
discounted probabilities. Finally, in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., the
Court refused to allow the limited assets of a litigation-crippled
asbestos defendant to serve as the basis for a compelled workout of
liabilities outside the formal structures of bankruptcy. 15
The difficulty presented by each of these cases runs to the core
of America's embrace of the notion of a private attorney general, a
liberalized competition for the right to be an agent not selected by the
principal. The difficulty in each of the three cases that reached the
Supreme Court turned on the tension between principles of finality in
settlement and the scope of the agency power of class counsel. None of
the challenged settlement arrangements would have raised an
eyebrow if negotiated by the principals themselves, or by counsel who
were directly retained by and contractually subject to oversight by
their clients. Parties acting on their own behalf are free to settle their
private disputes without the formalities of actually filing suit over
claims (the issue in Matsushita) or agreeing to anticipated damages
for potential future claims (the stumbling blocks in the asbestos
cases). The difficulty arises only when an unselected and effectively
unsupervised agent settles on behalf of an absent class member.
American law responds to this tension in two ways, one formal
and one a matter of intuition. The formal mechanism is to compel
proposed class settlements into the strictures of the rules of procedure
governing class actions. As recognized by the Court in Amchem, the fit
is less than perfect. 16 The rules are structured to guide litigated
disputes through the process of pleading, discovery, and trial. A
consensual workout fits the formal rules structures poorly. Instead, in
most class settlements, the Court retreats to what may be termed the
"due process minima" first identified in Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts.17 This requires individual notice, an opportunity (in the case of
damages actions) to exclude oneself from the binding class resolution
through the opt-out process, and a guarantee of unconflicted
representation. Where the amounts at stake are small or the prospect
of future injury is remote, courts and commentators are skeptical
whether these procedural protections amount to much at all.'8
15. 527 U.S. 815, 864-65 (1999).
16. 521 U.S. at 629 ("Rule 23, which must be interpreted with fidelity to the Rules Enabling
Act and applied with the interests of absent class members in close view, cannot carry the large
load [that the defendants], class counsel, and the District Court heaped upon it.").
17. 472 U.S. 797, 803 (1985).
18. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on
Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1535 (2006) (discussing the
shortcomings of class actions in achieving compensation for plaintiffs).
[Vol.62:1:179
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Judicial intuition is a harder concept to define formally, but we
believe it does some work. The key to the optimal class action is the
principle of "if as to one, then as to all." No claimed broad-scale harm
is likely to leave its victims in truly identical situations, but courts
respond to the appearance of class members having basically fungible
claims. In Matsushita, for example, there was no real difference
between the shareholders who composed the class (except as to the
quantum of their losses). The underlying claims all emerged from the
same set of financial transactions, regardless of whether dressed up as
state law or in federal garb. A common settlement not only comported
with an intuitive understanding of the case, it seemed inevitable,
regardless of the forum in which the action might have gone forward.
By contrast, the sweeping asbestos settlements gave the
impression of the bill of peace being stretched beyond its obvious role.
In Amchem, most notably, the class was made up of claimants with
substantially different diseases, with claims against different
manufacturers (and by extension insurers), with different future
prognoses, and with wildly different sets of personal losses and
suffering. 19 The integrity of mass resolution could neither be tested
against a potential litigation of the claims (a poor test in any event
given the paucity of trials generally in the American legal system20 )
nor by a representational structure attuned to the more striking
differences among the represented claimants, most critically the
present injured and the unknowing future victims.
Apart from any intuitive sense of the propriety of any
particular mass settlement practice, the fact remains that the class
action settlement scene appears dominated by class counsel offering to
settle claims of those they do not represent. Amchem and Ortiz really
only touched on the core problem in the context of the manifestly
variegated classes of far-flung personal injury victims. But the same
process repeats itself across the spectrum of cases involving only
economic harms in the consumer, antitrust, and securities areas.
Recent notable reforms to the role of the lead plaintiff under the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and to Rule 23 have attended
to the image of class counsel as itinerant purveyor of settlements.2 1
But the issue remains very much alive in the American context.
19. 521 U.S. at 624 ("No settlement class called to our attention is as sprawling as this
one.").
20. See generally Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459,
460-64 (2004) (discussing the declining number of trials in the United States).
21. See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2000)
(establishing, inter alia, procedure for appointing lead plaintiff with most significant financial
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B. Limited Recoveries
In virtually all class actions, the mnst significant recovery is by
successful class counsel, not by any class member individually. Since
attorneys are paid almost uniformly on a percentage of the common
fund basis, 22 this is not only predictable, it is inevitable. Assume that
attorney compensation in common fund class actions runs in the range
of ten to thirty percent of the total class recovery. Just as a matter of
simple mathematics, the only way a class member could recover on the
same basis as counsel would be if a single class member had suffered
between ten and thirty percent of the harm. Assuming the underlying
claim to be the malfunctioning of a one hundred dollar widget, there
would have to be a consumer who repeatedly bought the same widget
to discover again and again that it did not work before this level of
harm could be reached. We confess that our impulse would be to take
this woe-begotten consumer ungently by the shoulders and ask, "Idiot,
idiot, what were you thinking?"
Alternatively, it is argued that the recoveries in consumer
cases are often sufficiently small that no rational person would ever
pursue a claim for such amounts.23 In such cases, class counsel are
engaged in what the common law would have defined as the offense of
barratry, the willful stirring up of legal disputes for purposes of
profiting thereby.24 The smaller the actual harm visited on any
individual consumer, the more apparent the fact that the driving force
behind the litigation has to be someone with an actual stake in its
stake in the controversy); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) (establishing procedures for appointing class
counsel); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) (establishing procedures for determining attorney fee awards).
22. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements:
An Empirical Study, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27, 28 (2004) (showing that regardless of
formal compensation system, size of fund is best predictor of attorney compensation).
23. See, e.g., Thomas Burch, Necessity Never Made a Good Bargain: When Consumer
Arbitration Agreements Prohibit Class Relief, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1005, 1027 (2004)
(acknowledging the tendency for potential plaintiffs in consumer cases to be deterred from
bringing meritorious claims for small recoveries).
24. Barratry is traditionally defined as the "offence of frequently exciting and stirring up
suits and quarrels between [parties]." WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *134. A related
offence, champerty, is the division of the proceeds from litigation between the party in interest
and a financial backer of the litigation. It is defined historically as a bargain for the
"maintenance" of a suit constituting "an officious intermeddling in a suit that no way belongs to
one, by maintaining or assisting either party with money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend it."
Id. Some jurisdictions in the United States have entirely abandoned the common law claims of
champerty, maintenance, and barratry, in favor of laws governing contingency fees, misconduct,
and the bringing of frivolous suits. See, e.g., Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1224, 1226-
27 (Mass. 1997) (declining to recognize the doctrines of champerty, barratry, and maintenance);
Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana L.P., 532 S.E.2d 269, 277-78 (S.C. 2000) (abolishing champerty as a
defense).
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outcome, someone who stands to be paid from the overall amount in
controversy rather than any individual's recovery. In such cases, the
principal-agent relationship that normally characterizes the roles of
client and attorney is disrupted because the agent in effect creates the
principal, or at least organizes the principal through collective
representation.
To our minds, the only surprising thing about these related
criticisms is that they are treated with any measure of surprise. The
class action, as Judith Resnik aptly summarized it, is a state-created
mechanism for subsidizing the litigation of claims that could not
otherwise be justified.25 The state in effect designates the agent,
underwrites the cost of representation by removing the transactional
barrier of having to contract with each client, and allows for a state-
enforced taxation of the joint gains to compensate the agent. At least
in the context of low-value claims, it is not only to be expected, it is
necessary that the agent be paid much more than any individual
might stand to recover. Otherwise, the transactional costs of litigation
would make every sane consumer unwilling to pursue an individual
claim.
Consequently, the charge that class actions allow claims into
the legal system that would not otherwise be brought is curious, to say
the least. Of course they do; indeed, that is the prime justification for
a class action in the first place.
The more serious issue is why a legal system would encourage
the prosecution of low-value claims that are unlikely to lead to much
recovery by the affected class members. This opens up a much broader
discussion about the role of deterrence, the importance of ex post
mechanisms of accountability, 26 and the general trade-offs between
public and private enforcement. These are matters that have been
extensively explored elsewhere, including in our prior writings. Our
point here, however, is a more limited one. To the extent that the law
wants to harness private enforcement to deter (and secondarily to
compensate for) the harms that typify mass consumer markets, there
must be procedures that make such conduct not only feasible but
financially remunerative as well. And, yet, the less-than-platonic
interests of class counsel in profiting from their representation are a
constant source of disparagement of American class actions.
25. Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and
Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2127-
29 (2000).
26. For a more elaborate treatment of this issue, see Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating After
the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 375 (2007).
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C. Corruption
The past year has seen the fall from grace of several of the
leading plaintiffs' counsel in class representations. Amid the guilty
pleas of the leading figures of the securities bar,27 and a similar plea
by perhaps the most well-known figure in the mass tort bar,28 have
followed less high-profile but equally disturbing indictments of
lawyers charged with criminal misconduct in mass actions. 29 The facts
and the severity of the conduct vary from case to case. But the
inescapable impression is of a deeply corrupt set of practitioners called
to justice. If we may conclude that where there is smoke, there must
be fire, then surely where there is fire, there must be conflagration.
Does this not lend credence to the fundamental error of American
practice? Licensing entrepreneurial activity in search of bounties must
surely lead to this form of misconduct-or at least so goes the
argument.
No one should countenance criminal misconduct and the
breach of some of the most solemn obligations shared by all lawyers.
And, surely, there is some connection between the American use of the
private attorney general and the capacity for this kind of misconduct.
Entrepreneurial enterprises seek to harness the desire for self gain,
and the line between invisible-hand style self-interest and avarice is a
fine one indeed. The spate of current scandals in the United States
comports well with European expectations, reinforcing their
reluctance to license private lawyering in the service of collective
redress.
Before becoming too enraptured with the perfidy of American
love of self-interest as a motivator, however, a cautionary note: The
question is always--compared to what? Most studies of regulatory
behavior indicate that with the expansion of the centralized state
27. Jonathan D. Glater, Class-Action Lawyer Gets 30 Months in Prison, N.Y. TIMES, June 3,
2008, at C3 (discussing plea deals of Melvyn I. Weiss and William S. Lerach for their roles in
'concealing illegal kickbacks to plaintiffs").
28. Abha Bhattarai, Class-Action Lawyer Given 5 Years in a Bribery Case, N.Y. TIMES, June
28, 2008, at C3 (noting that Richard F. Scruggs, who gained fame for winning a multi-billion
dollar settlement from the tobacco industry in the 1990s, was sentenced for attempting to bribe a
Mississippi judge in a dispute over an insurance settlement arising out of Hurricane Katrina).
Notably, the New York Times could not distinguish between court-supervised class actions, and
private aggregations of individual cases - thus the reference to Richard Scruggs, a mass harm
plaintiffs' lawyer, as a "class-action lawyer." Id.
29. See, e.g., Julie Kay, Asbestos Attorney Accepts 10-Year Term in Plea Deal, DAILY BUS.
REV. (Miami), Apr. 19, 2007, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1176887061450
(noting that Miami attorney Louis Robles was indicted for "misappropriating $13.5 million in
settlements").
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comes an expansion of the gains to be had from political influence.
30
And with that expansion of state control comes a corresponding
propensity toward corruption. 31 As one of the more comprehensive
studies summarizes: "[H]eavier regulation of entry is generally
associated with greater corruption and a larger unofficial economy,
but not with better quality of private or public goods." 32 American
entrepreneurial lawyering may yield misconduct; yet it is hardly as if
the whiff of scandal has not reached countries more comfortably in the
civil law tradition of state control. And, there can be no doubt that
many of the more difficult features of American law turn on
institutional arrangements such as the civil jury and elected judges,
which have nothing to do with the forms of private enforcement.
Nonetheless, here again European concerns over some of the
excesses of American lawyer-initiated mass actions correspond to
concerns in the United States as well.
D. Magnets and Hellholes
The Shutts decision did more than simply set out the minimum
due process constraints for the organization of a nationwide class
action. In an opinion by then Justice Rehnquist, the Court looked to
the class action as a quasi-administrative proceeding that could
centralize comparably situated claims scattered across the country
into one forum. 33 What Shutts did not address was the question of
which was the proper forum for that centralization. That left open the
possibility-soon realized-that cases of national scope, because of the
undifferentiated movement of goods and services across the national
market, could be brought anywhere that one aggrieved potential class
member could be found. In practice, this meant that plaintiffs, as the
first movers in litigation, could select any desirable forum for the
litigation of claims of nationwide sweep.
30. Alberto Ades & Rafael Di Tella, National Champions and Corruption: Some Unpleasant
Interventionist Arithmetic, 107 ECON. J. 1023, 1025 (1997); Vito Tanzi, Corruption Around the
World: Causes, Consequences, Scope and Cures, 45 INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF PAPERS 559,
566-67 (1998).
31. Daron Acemoglu & Thierry Verdier, The Choice between Market Failures and
Corruption, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 194, 194-95 (2000); Alicia Adsera et al., Are You Being Served?
Political Accountability and Quality of Government, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 445, 450 (2003);
Simeon Djankov et al., The Regulation of Entry, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1, 35 (2002); Rafael La Porta et
al., The Quality of Government, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 222, 239 (1999); Andrei Shleifer & Robert
W. Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q.J. ECON. 599, 600 (1993).
32. Djankov et al., supra note 31, at 35.
33. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985).
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Cases of national scope quickly pointed to the frailty of a
federal system.34 The strength of a federal system is the diversity of
responses to the common problems of social organization, what Justice
Brandeis famously referred to as the "laboratories of democracy." 35
But Brandeis's premise was that each unit of federalist
experimentation would be an autonomous enterprise whose relative
merits and demerits would be observable. The post-Shutts world,
however, allowed each local jurisdiction to test its experimental
regime not within its geographic boundaries, but wherever similarly
situated claimants might happen to be found.
The effect of Shutts was to liberalize the ability to coordinate a
case of national scope into one forum, without providing any tools for
resolving which forum that should be. Once we add differences in local
rules governing aggregation, different legal cultures across the range
of potential jurisdictions, the possibility of untoward influence with
locally elected judges in some locales, and a range of other such
experimental variables, the potential for strategic manipulation of
forum becomes ever present. The results were repeated criticisms,
some no doubt well founded, of certain choice places being a "magnet
forum" or, less benignly, a "judicial hellhole" for the ensnared
defendant. 36
Leaving aside the problem of potential undue local influence or
even corruption, the broader problem is the inevitable mismatch
between locally based forms of judicial redress and markets that
necessarily transcend local control. In the United States, the partial
response has been to provide an expanded form of federal jurisdiction
34. This Section is a pared down version of arguments more fully developed in Samuel
Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353 (2006),
and Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under Attack, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 1649 (2008).
35. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
36. As expressed in the legislative history of the Class Action Fairness Act:
The reason for th[e] dramatic increase in state court class actions cannot be
found in variations in class actions rules; after all, the rules governing the
decision whether cases may proceed as class actions are basically the same in
federal and state courts - and of course, they are the same within states, i.e.,
the same in "magnet" jurisdictions such as Madison County and St. Clair
County, Illinois, as they are in more easily accessible jurisdictions such as
Cook County, Illinois.
S. REP. No. 109-14, at 13 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 13; see also id. at 21
(discussing the filing of frivolous class actions); John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller,
They're Making a Federal Case Out of It... in State Court, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 143, 155
(2001) (finding that "class action lawyers are bringing a large number of cases in a small number
of state courts that have become 'magnets' for interstate class actions").
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to allow nationwide cases to be brought into federal court 37 and, once
there, to be consolidated for efficient pretrial development in one
suitable federal court. 38 These mechanisms leave unresolved conflicts
in state laws governing the distribution of identical goods and services
along a national supply chain.39 But they are at least attentive to the
problem of multiple potential venues for the same alleged misconduct.
It does not take great foresight to anticipate that the same
problem of rival prospects for aggregation might take root in Europe
as well. The European experiment with federalism begins with
independent nation-states, rather than the more limited American
states. But the problem is made more acute because of the absence of
European courts of first instance, the equivalent of the American
federal court system. Since claims of aggregate harm are necessarily
tried in the national courts, with national procedures, the tension
between the EU's commitment to the free movement of goods and
services and the local application of justice reproduces the American
difficulties.
What unifies the four American controversies is precisely what
most troubles Europeans about American class action practice: the
role of private entrepreneurial lawyers. Each of the controversies in
American practice returns to the issue of the incentives operating on
lawyers who will predictably push the boundaries of the system. Yet,
the simple fact is that lawyer initiative is the engine that fuels
American aggregative practice. The question for reformers on both
sides of the Atlantic is whether the endemic controversies that arise in
a system built on self-interest can be mitigated without disabling the
entire undertaking. In aphoristic terms, the question is very much one
of throwing out the baby with the bathwater.
II. INCENTIVES, EUROPEAN-STYLE
Having looked at some of the flashpoints in American-style
class actions, let us take a trip across the pond to Europe. Rules here
are rapidly changing, and new proposals and recommendations are
appearing at a dizzying rate. Analyzing European class actions is like
37. This is the effect of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1712-
1715 (2000).
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000) (authorizing the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation
to consolidate actions in federal courts "for the convenience of parties and witnesses and [to]
promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions").
39. See Samuel Issacharoff, Settled Expectation in a World of Unsettled Law: Choice of Law
after the Class Action Fairness Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1839, 1840-44 (2006) (examining
conflicts of law in national market cases).
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shooting at a moving target. Each country is also unique, with its own
legal culture, history, constitution, political system, court system, and
rules governing the legal profession. It is risky, therefore, to attempt a
detailed analysis of any particular country's venture into class actions,
especially given our lack of detailed knowledge of any particular
European system. What we can do is examine certain features that
commonly appear in the European setting without suggesting that
these features appear in every country or that our stylized and general
description of these features accurately reflects the detailed law of any
particular country.40
Three features in particular stand out: (1) the tendency to
allow only organizations to represent consumers in class action cases,
(2) the interaction between rules on litigation funding and class action
procedures, and (3) the preference for "opt-in" as opposed to "opt-out"
systems.
A. Organizational Standing
Class action procedures in Europe often restrict lead plaintiff
rights to organizations that represent consumer interests.41 This
approach contrasts with that of the United States, where any class
member can seek to represent the class. It is not necessary in the
United States for the class representative to be an organization. All
that is required is that the candidate demonstrates that he will
provide adequate representation and that his claims are typical of the
claims of other class members. 42
Rules limiting the lead plaintiff role to consumer organizations
or similar groups appear designed to serve four objectives. First, like
40. Class action procedures obviously vary across European countries. For a useful country-
by-country table summarizing major recent developments in aggregate litigation in Europe, see
Nagareda, supra note 5, at 21-25. For more extensive comparative analysis of current European
law, see JULES STUYCK ET AL., AN ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF
CONSUMER REDRESS OTHER THAN REDRESS THROUGH ORDINARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS (2007),
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress/reports-studies/comparative-report-en.pdf; see also
RACHAEL MULHERON, REFORM OF COLLECTIVE REDRESS IN ENGLAND AND WALES: A PERSPECTIVE
OF NEED 79-120 (2008), http://www.civiljusticecouncil.gov.uk/files/collective_redress.pdf.
41. See Fabrizio Cafaggi & Hans-W. Micklitz, Collective Enforcement of Consumer Law: A
Framework for Comparative Assessment, 16 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 391, 417 (2008) ("The majority
of Member States in Europe start from the premise that consumer organizations should be given
a role in administrative and/or in judicial enforcement."); Harbour & Shelley, supra note 9, at 28
(discussing approaches of Spain and the Netherlands). A recent exception is Spain, which does
not restrict lead plaintiff rights solely to organizations - groups of individuals acting through a
single lawyer can also maintain group actions.
42. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (listing the prerequisites for class actions). Additional
requirements apply in securities fraud cases, as we will discuss below.
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the requirements of typicality and adequacy under U.S. law, these
rules select as the class representative a party who is expected to
provide competent and loyal services to absent class members. Second,
rules on organizational standing try to ensure that the class
representative has the resources to pay the expenses of the case under
prevailing rules on litigation funding. Third, these rules seek to
thwart the emergence of American-style entrepreneurial class action
attorneys. Fourth, and finally, there may be a jurisprudential element
in organizational standing: the idea-often vaguely conceptualized-
that the temporary authorization of a random individual to represent
a class is simply an insufficient basis for the court to take cognizance
of the interest of absent parties. Something more substantial, such as
a preexisting relationship with an established group, may be needed.
We will look at each of these justifications.
The last concern-jurisprudential problems with individual
class members acting as lead plaintiffs-should not detain us long. All
countries, as far as we know, recognize that people can be authorized
to act on behalf of others. This is why the law of agency exists. There
should be nothing in any well-developed legal system that prevents a
court, if authorized by law and otherwise empowered to adjudicate a
case, from appointing a party to represent the interests of others not
present before the court.
The other three concerns, however, require more detailed
investigation. In this Section we will examine two of the justifications,
deferring for the next Section the investigation of whether
organizations are better able to fund class action litigation.
So, will consumer organizations provide competent services to
the class? The answer is probably a qualified "yes." Of course, merely
having the status of a consumer organization does not mean that the
people who work in the organization actually know how to manage
lawsuits. Regardless of the title, an organization might be
incompetent at the task, in which case the organization will not be a
good class representative. But we can assume that organizations that
purport to represent consumers usually have at least some expertise
in enforcing consumers' legal rights. Moreover, the courts that appoint
these organizations as lead plaintiffs should have discretion to assess
whether the candidates for the position have the qualifications to do
the work. On this score, organizational standing appears superior to
the more liberal standing rules under U.S. class action practice, where
the courts, especially in consumer cases, routinely accept class
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representatives whose understanding of the case can be charitably
described as minimal.43
Even if they are competent, will consumer organizations
provide loyal service to the class? Will they act as faithful fiduciaries
of class interests? 44 Here the analysis is more qualified. We may
assume that consumer organizations are staffed by people who
conceive of themselves as dedicated to the cause of consumer
protection. But even dedicated and idealistic people may not act as
faithful champions when their guiding principles do not overlap with
the interests of those they are assigned to represent.
The loyalty of consumer organizations to class member
interests depends, to an extent, on a legal issue: Are the organizations
in question entitled under a given country's law to sue on behalf of all
consumers, or is their representational status limited to their own
membership?45 If the organization can sue on behalf of all consumers,
whether or not they are members of the organization, substantial
agency problems can arise. The interests of nonprofit consumer
organizations may reflect ideological considerations that may not
necessarily coincide with the economic interests of consumers.
Suppose, for example, that an organization empowered to act as a
class representative is committed to environmental protection-a
noble aspiration, but not one necessarily consonant with the interests
of a class of consumers who desire competitively priced products. If
this organization selects cases and litigation strategy on the basis of
environmental considerations-going easy, let's say, on companies
that donate money to Greenpeace while vigorously pursuing
companies that produce genetically modified crops-the enforcement
of consumer interests would be skewed in ways that do not necessarily
reflect the interests of consumers as a whole, who might prefer
cheaper prices to greener products. This potential for distorted
representation as a result of a distinct policy agenda is not as
worrisome in U.S. class action litigation, where the class is usually
represented by attorneys whose interests are in obtaining a fee, not in
changing the world.
43. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Competing Bids in Class Action Settlements, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV.
633, 634 & n.2 (2003) (citing literature indicating that "representative plaintiffs are usually mere
eponyms").
44. For a perceptive analysis stressing the problems of accountability for consumer
organizations, see Cafaggi & Micklitz, supra note 41, at 391 ("Consumer associations empowered
with enforcement need to become more accountable towards members and the general public.").
45. Harbour & Shelley, supra note 9, at 28 (noting that Spain permits consumer
organizations to bring actions on behalf of both their membership and unidentified victims).
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This problem of ideological distortion is mitigated if many
consumer organizations with different viewpoints are qualified to act
as class representatives. When lots of organizations are available, the
decision by one organization not to bring a case for ideological reasons
doesn't prevent the case from being litigated by some other
organization that may have different beliefs. The problem is not
entirely solved, however. People with strong views tend to exercise
disproportionate influence in voluntary organizations. Even when
many organizations are qualified to act as class representatives,
therefore, the consumer interest may not be fully represented. In such
an environment, valid consumer cases may not be brought simply
because no organization feels it desirable to do so. 46 Even when cases
are brought, moreover, the organization given lead plaintiff status
may elect to litigate the case through the perspective of its special
concerns. For example, the class representative might settle a case in
exchange for changes in business practices which address the
organization's interests, but which do not provide effective relief for
consumers.
These concerns about ideological activities of consumer
organizations are not as troubling if an organization is permitted only
to represent its own members rather than all persons injured by the
challenged product or practice. People who join an organization
usually endorse its stance on public issues. They are not prejudiced if
the organization makes litigation decisions based on ideological factors
with which they agree. But the problem of fidelity to consumer
interests is only partially addressed when an organization is limited to
representing its own members. If injunctive relief is permitted, for
example, the organization may seek changes in the defendant's
practices which serve the interests of the organization and its
members, but which do not serve the interests of others. Moreover, if
organizations represent only their own members, some consumers
may receive no representation at all-an even worse outcome than if
they receive representation that is only partially faithful to their
interests.
Other problems of loyalty may be presented aside from
ideological distortion of litigation decisions. There is always the risk,
46. In the United States, for example, class actions have been brought against a company
that manufactures chewing tobacco, claiming that the defendant illegally manipulated the
market in this product. E.g., In re Mass. Smokeless Tobacco Litig., No. 03-5038-BLS1 (Mass.
Sup. Ct. Apr. 7, 2008). Because chewing tobacco is often considered to be a dangerous product,
one could imagine that no consumer organization would take this case because the result, if the
case succeeded, is that chewing tobacco would be cheaper and easier to obtain. One of us (Miller)
has acted as an expert witness in a number of these cases.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
for example, that managers will not act as faithful agents of their
organizations. Managers may misappropriate funds, pay themselves
excessive salaries, appoint family or friends to jobs in the
organization, or simply take too many holidays. These sorts of conflicts
of interest may detract from the organization's ability to represent
class members. The organization's role as lead counsel creates still
other opportunities for managers to place personal gain over the
interests of their institutions. If the organization has the power to
allocate lucrative legal work, for example, there may be fruitful
opportunities for referral fees from the law firms that receive these
assignments.
These problems with organizational standing do not
necessarily imply that European organizational standing rules are
inferior to the American approach. All organizations face agency costs.
The challenge for legal design is to find a structure of rights, duties,
and incentives that delivers the best package overall. If consumer
organizations do manifest the problems described, moreover, the
courts and legislatures will doubtless seek ways to deal with them.
The question is whether organizational standing offers the best
approach to protecting consumer interests or whether some other
approach would be superior.
The next issue is whether consumer organizations will be able
to avoid being captured by entrepreneurial attorneys. Assuming for
present purposes that entrepreneurial attorneys are bad for class
action litigation-a topic investigated in Part I-the question is, will
consumer organizations prevent this blight from springing up in
Europe? American experience is instructive here. The Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"), a statute enacted in 1995,
assigns lead plaintiff rights in federal securities fraud cases to the
class member with the most significant stake in the controversy. 47 The
purpose was to bring entrepreneurial attorneys to heel. 48 The lead
plaintiff rules were intended to insert an active, sophisticated party
with a genuine stake in the controversy as the champion of class
interests, in order to counterbalance the power of self-interested
plaintiffs' firms. 49
These rules have changed securities litigation in the United
States, in that the plaintiffs in these cases today are often
47. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2000).
48. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (noting "abusive practices committed in
private securities litigation," including "routine filing of lawsuits against issuers of securities and
others whenever there is a significant change in an issuer's stock price, without regard to any
underlying culpability of the issuer").
49. Id. at 34-35.
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institutional investors with significant amounts at stake. Institutional
investors appear to exercise somewhat more control over class counsel
than the individual plaintiffs who served as class representatives
before the PSLRA was enacted. 50 There is even evidence that
attorneys' fees are lower when institutional investors act as lead
plaintiffs. 51 Overall, however, the lead plaintiff rules have not
significantly changed the environment. The same firms that
dominated class action litigation prior to 1995 control it today
(although some attorneys have departed for other reasons).52
Entrepreneurial attorneys continue to dominate securities class action
practice today as they did in prior years. 53
The U.S. experience suggests that the selection of consumer
organizations to act as class champions may not, in and of itself,
prevent class litigation from being dominated by self-interested
attorneys. It is possible that attorneys may form their own consumer
organizations with a view towards awarding themselves the right to
litigate cases entrusted to these entities. Even if the organization is
formally independent, attorneys interested in obtaining fees may find
many ways to obtain influence. The allocation of control over cases
under European organizational standing rules will predictably depend
on matters such as the stature and funding of the organization; its
financial stake in the litigation; the source of funding for class counsel;
the power, prestige, and qualifications of counsel; and the relationship
between counsel and the management of the organization.
B. Litigation Funding
In law, as in life, it is dangerous to make an unqualified
statement for fear of immediate refutation. But one thing seems
certain: there are no societies where lawyers work for free. As the fool
puts it in King Lear, worthless words are "like the breath of an unfeed
lawyer-you gave me nothing for't"54 It can safely be said that none of
50. See Michael A. Perino, Institutional Activism through Litigation: An Empirical
Assessment of Public Pension Fund Participation in Securities Class Actions 1 (St. John's Univ.
Sch. of Law Legal Stud. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 06-0055, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=938722.
51. Id.
52. See Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers:
Changes During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1489 (2006)
(finding that "individual law firms' market shares ... suffered no appreciable change in the wake
of the PSLRA").
53. See id. (finding that "few plaintiff law firms either entered or exited the market after
the enactment of the PSLRA").
54. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act I, sc. 4.
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the class action procedures adopted or proposed across Europe in
recent years will succeed if they fail to compensate counsel
adequately. This is not a controversial point. Others more familiar
with the European legal landscape have made the same observation.55
But carrying that recommendation into reality, in the context of
European legal systems, can be a challenging task.
Two rules commonly found in European procedure present
problems for class actions. First is the prohibition on contingency fees.
This rule is beginning to break down; for example, the German
Constitutional Court recently ruled that the ban on contingency fees
unconstitutionally burdens clients' rights of access to the courts and
attorneys' rights to practice their profession.56 England and Wales also
permit a form of contingency fees, and the concept appears to be
gaining momentum elsewhere. 57 But where the ban on contingency
fees remains in effect-and this seems to be many places-the
consequences for class action litigation are significant.
The contingency fee permits the attorney to fund the litigation
and thus overcomes problems of liquidity that may make it impossible
for an individual to pursue his rights. Attorneys are good litigation
funders. As legal specialists, they have the ability to assess the value
of suits. They will thus tend to direct valuable resources (their time
and energy) to cases that offer the largest expected benefit for class
members and society as a whole. Because attorneys handle numerous
lawsuits, moreover, they can achieve portfolio diversification in ways
not possible for ordinary clients, who are usually involved in only one.
And attorneys tend to have better liquidity than consumers. They
finance cases through their own efforts. If bank financing is required,
55. See Cafaggi & Micklitz, supra note 41, at 391 ("Pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives
need to be provided for plaintiffs' lawyers. These may not be only market driven, but also public
policy oriented, thus affecting the selection of claims to be litigated.").
56. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 12, 2006,
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfGE] 1 BvR 2576/04, available at
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs200612l2_1bvr257604.html.
57. Since the 1990s, England and Wales have allowed the conditional fee model, which
takes two forms: a "no win no fee" agreement and an uplifted fee if the case is successful. In
either case, the size of the increased fee is independent of the award or settlement in the case.
CHRISTOPHER HODGES, GLOBAL CLASS ACTIONS PROJECT COUNTRY REPORT: ENGLAND AND
WALES 27-28 (2007), available at http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/PDF/
EnglandLegislation.pdf. Other European nations have experimented with, or are considering,
introducing this system of financing litigation. Winand Emons, Conditional Versus Contingent
Fees, 59 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 89, 89-90 (2007). For a detailed history of the adoption of the
conditional fee system in England, see Richard L. Abel, An American Hamburger Stand in St.
Paul's Cathedral: Replacing Legal Aid with Conditional Fees in English Personal Injury
Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 253, 253-57 (2001) (outlining the history of and policy behind the
adoption of contingent fees in England).
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they are probably better than their clients at obtaining loans at
favorable rates. Accordingly, the contingent fee can generate effective
funding of class action litigation. Essentially all U.S. class actions are
funded with contingent fees.
It is difficult, however, to design an effective class action
procedure in the absence of a contingent fee. Consider the case where
the law imposes on an individual plaintiff the responsibility to pay the
expenses of litigation with no right of contribution from other class
members, as under the German representative action for securities
improprieties. Under these conditions, the plaintiff faces the following
payoffs: if the case succeeds, receive his or her share of the class
recovery (which may be only a few euros); if the case fails, pay not only
the class attorneys' fees, but the defendant's fee as well. No rational
individual would be willing to serve as class representative in these
conditions.
A few jurisdictions have experimented with litigation funding
corporations as a means for capitalizing class action litigation. The
concept is perhaps best developed in Australia, where several such
firms are in operation; one is even listed on the Australian Stock
Exchange. 58 These organizations, which also operate in Canada,
advance funds for the litigation and provide indemnities against
possible liability for fees in exchange for a cut of the proceeds if the
plaintiffs succeed. 59 Such organizations do not appear to have caught
on to any substantial extent in Europe. Litigation funding companies
are an innovative solution to the funding problem. At bottom,
however, they appear to rely on rules for allocating litigation proceeds
that are functionally similar to the contingent fee.
Another alternative to the litigation funding dilemma is to use
organizations as representative plaintiffs. The advantage of these
parties is that they may have a budget to cover the costs of consumer
suits and therefore may not be as liquidity constrained as the average
consumer. Even so, organizations are likely to face difficulty in
funding class action litigation in the absence of a contingent fee.
Money does not materialize out of the sky. Who will fund the
organizations?
58. See IMF (Australia) Ltd Home Page, http://www.imf.com.au/ ("IMF is a publicly listed
company providing funding of legal claims and other related services where the claim size is over
$2 million.") (last visited Jan. 4, 2009).
59. The Australian Supreme Court upheld such arrangements against the claim that they
violate rules against champerty and maintenance. See Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd. v.
Fostif Pty Ltd. (2006) 229 A.L.R. 58, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/
2006/41.html ("By 'organising' persons into a legal action for the vindication of their legal rights,
representative proceedings are not creating controversies that did not exist.").
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Under traditional rules, it appears that an organization could
not get funding from the case itself.60 If a case succeeds, the benefits of
the judgment go to class members rather than to the organization. If a
case fails, a representative organization has to pay both its attorneys'
fees and the defendants' attorneys' fees. This is a losing proposition
overall; the organization either gains nothing or loses a lot. The rules
could of course be adjusted to allow organizations to collect a share of
the proceeds of successful cases prior to the payments to class
members. If these payments are large enough to compensate for the
costs of cases that fail, they can make these organizations financially
viable without other funding. But allowing the organizations to take a
share of the class recovery is nothing other than a contingent fee by
another name.
If organizations are not funded from the proceeds of successful
cases, they must find other sources of support. Class members are an
obvious possibility. But obtaining payment from class members is
fraught with difficulty.
Obtaining payment after the fact, in the absence of a prior
agreement, would appear all but impossible. Many class members
would probably refuse an organization's request that they share the
benefits of a judgment if the case succeeds. They are even less likely to
want to share the costs if the case fails.61 Even if, under applicable
law, a class member's decision to opt in to a case obligates him to pay
his share of the expenses if the case fails, an organization that fronts
such expenditures may face allegations that it did not properly inform
class members of the risks of opting in. It could be difficult for the
representative plaintiff to pursue class members for payment in this
situation.
Perhaps such organizations could condition membership on
payment of dues. With the money in hand, the organizations would
not face the challenge of collecting it post hoc. But dues paid in
advance also present difficulties. If the consumer organizations
60. Cf. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 64 (15th ed.
2004) ("Third-party standing is thus more likely to be allowed the closer the relationship and the
greater the identity of interest with the rightholder .... ").
61. One such case famously occurred in the United States. See Kamilewicz v. Bank of
Boston Corp., 100 F.3d 1348, 1349 (7th Cir. 1996) (involving a class action settlement case in
which class members were paid a settlement award, but after the attorneys' fees for obtaining
the settlement were deducted from their award, many class members yielded a net loss).
Subsequently Congress banned the practice under the Class Action Fairness Act. See 28 U.S.C. §
1713 (2000) (allowing court to "approve a proposed settlement under which any class member is
obligated to pay sums to class counsel that would result in a net loss to the class member only if
the court makes a written finding that nonmonetary benefits to the class member substantially
outweigh the monetary loss").
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represent everyone who is harmed by a defendant's conduct, rather
than just its membership, severe free rider problems arise. Consumers
would be better off not joining the organization and getting its services
for free. Even if the consumer organizations represent only their
members, organizations would have to charge dues sufficiently high to
compensate for anticipated litigation expenses. It is not clear that
consumers would be willing to pay these costs in advance when the
return on their investment is only the hope that they might someday
share in the recovery from a lawsuit. Consumer resistance to paying
dues in advance could be avoided if organizations conditioned
membership on taking a cut of the recovery if the case succeeds. But
again, this strategy is nothing more than a contingent fee under
another name.62
The other alternative for funding class action litigation appears
to be the government. Certainly the government has the necessary
resources. And because consumer class actions are brought on behalf
of large segments of the public, the argument in favor of public
funding is substantial. Yet government funding is not a panacea. If
organizations are funded by public authorities, their survival becomes
captive to politics. Funding is never certain, and in times of austerity
consumer organizations may find that their budgets are among the
first to be slashed. Moreover, the principle of "he who pays the piper
calls the tune" is likely to operate in the case of government funding.
Politicians may seek to influence the organization's behavior. Pursuit
of particular cases may be encouraged or discouraged by politicians
who wish to punish enemies or reward friends. In short, the
independence of consumer groups cannot be guaranteed if they rely on
public funding for their operations.6 3
Some of the funding problems associated with the lack of a
contingent fee could be alleviated if the "loser-pays" rules are reformed
to make the consequences less draconian. For example, in consumer
cases, the rule could be transformed into a "one-way" fee shifting
system, under which the defendant must pay counsel fees if the class
succeeds, but the class does not have to pay the defendant's fees if the
62. Free rider problems can also be problematic. If the consumer organization is allowed to
seek compensation for all injured consumers, not just those who are members of the
organization, then consumers would lose the incentive to join the organization in the first place
because by doing so they would be subsidizing class members who did not join.
63. The opposite problem may also be present. If an organization has strong views on
controversial topics, the provision of government funding could represent a potentially
troublesome subsidy by the government of private ideological activism.
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case fails.64 Eliminating class members' risk of liability could enhance
their willingness to participate in cases. Such proposals, however, can
be expected to be resisted by business interests, who may perceive
them as unfairly one-sided. Even if adopted, moreover, they would not
fully address the funding problem. Although they eliminate one cost of
litigation-the obligation to pay the defendant's fee if the case fails-
they do not eliminate another cost, namely, the obligation to pay class
counsel if the case fails. Unless a practicable means is found to pay
this cost, one-way attorneys' fees rules will not fully address the
funding problem for class action litigation.
C. Opt-in Versus Opt-out Procedures
A third notable feature of several European class action
procedures is that they utilize opt-in rather than opt-out mechanisms
(the recent Italian statute is an example). 65 No doubt, such opt-in
procedures have advantages. They ensure that class members join
litigation out of their own free will-in marked contrast with the opt-
out process, under which it is possible for a class member to be a part
of a lawsuit and suffer a preclusive judgment without any knowledge.
Opt-in procedures also respect the jurisprudential idea that litigation
cannot be legitimate, as regards an innocent party, unless he has
voluntarily agreed to join the action.
But opt-in procedures also pose problems. We will discuss three
of these difficulties: problems with incentivizing a named plaintiff
under an opt-in regime, difficulties in attracting adequate
participation rates, and the challenge of offering defendants the
opportunity to achieve global peace through the class procedure. We
then turn to the relation between the choice of opt-in or opt-out rules
on the objectives of deterrence and risk internalization that underlie a
system of after-the-fact liability for wrongful conduct.
64. Quebec has apparently come close to this approach by limiting class members' liability
to nominal costs. Garry D. Watson, Class Actions: The Canadian Experience, 11 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 269, 274 (2001). Ontario has established a public corporation charged with reimbursing
unsuccessful lead plaintiffs for cost obligations. Id. at 274-75.
65. Legislative Decree, Sept. 6, 2005, No. 206, art. 139 (Italy), available at
http://www.sviluppoeconomico.gov.it/pdfiupload/documenti/phphBdUES.pdf; Stefano Capiello,
Supervision and Class Action Against Conflicts of Interest in Universal Banking: The U.S.
Experience vis-&-vis Recent Italian Initiatives 21-25 (N.Y.U. Hauser Global Law Working Series,
Paper No. 03/2007, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstractid=949896.
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1. Who Will Step Forward?
Opt-in procedures can create complicated strategic dynamics
that can impede or prevent the successful protection of consumer
rights. In particular, they can create a barrier for anyone to step
forward as the representative plaintiff-a feature that has hampered
the application of the new Capital Markets Model Case Act in
Germany, for example. 66 So long as there are collective gains to be had
from being a passive party in a representative action, and so long as
that is coupled with the risk of suffering losses if one is the
representative party, the overwhelming temptation will be to remain a
passive free rider. The losses are of two forms. The simpler is the loss
that comes from actually being a party to losing litigation. The
disparity between the loss that the representative party may face and
the risks of the other potential claimants can be mitigated by
expanding the preclusive effect of a representative judgment that the
individual may realize-a practice that appears to be gaining favor in
England and Wales under Group Litigation Orders. But the deeper
problem is that, so long as there is a loser-pays rule, the named
claimant in the representative action is being asked to assume the
entirety of the risks associated with a failed venture, while delivering
a common good to the other claimants if successful. Whenever there is
such a marked disparity between concentrated risks and diffuse
benefits, the temptation to free ride is dramatic. And, in the absence of
a coordination mechanism on cost exposure, one would expect the
classic form of failure associated with collective action problems.
2. Insufficient Participation
American experience suggests that the opt-in procedure will
face difficulty in attracting widespread participation. The reason is
inertia. Experience under American opt-out rules confirms that class
members usually do nothing. They almost never opt out. In consumer
cases, on average, less than .2 percent-two in a thousand-exercise
the right to exclude themselves from the case. 67
66. DIETMAR BAETGE, CLASS ACTIONS, GROUP LITIGATION & OTHER FORMS OF COLLECTIVE
LITIGATION: GERMANY 31 (2007), available at http://globalclassactions.stanford.eduPDF/
GermanyNationalReport.pdf.
67. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class
Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1532 (2004) (deriving
this figure from a study examining several thousand class action decisions between 1993 and
2003).
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Opt-out rates are somewhat informative about probable
participation under European opt-in procedures, but they need to be
evaluated with caution because of a significant difference between the
contexts. In the case of opt-outs, the path of inertia-doing nothing-is
also the path of rationality. It is nearly always in the class member's
interest not to opt out of class cases. If the class member opts out, he
gains virtually nothing but loses the right to participate in whatever
benefit the class litigation may generate-a small benefit, perhaps,
but still one that confers some value. Conversely, if the class member
does nothing, he loses nothing other than an essentially worthless
right to bring his own lawsuit, but he gains the right to participate in
the proceeds of the litigation. A rational class member will not opt out.
The incentives are otherwise with the opt-in decision. Here,
rationality counsels class members to opt in. If the class member opts
in, he gets to participate in whatever value the class action may
generate, whereas if he fails to opt in, he forfeits the right to
participate in the class case and gains only the essentially worthless
right to bring his own individual action. In opt-in cases, the path of
rationality is to act rather than to do nothing. Thus the behavior of
class members in opt-out cases, where inertia and rationality coincide,
will not necessarily carry over to opt-out cases, where they conflict.
A more direct analogue to European opt-in statutes is found in
three American statutes that use opt-in rather than opt-out
procedures: the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 68 the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 69 and the Equal Pay Act. 70 Evidence from
reported cases suggests that participation rates under these statutes
are around fifty percent. 71 Although not as high as they might be if
class members behaved rationally, such participation rates are not at
all bad. But we should not readily conclude that consumer class
actions in European opt-in regimes will have similar participation
rates. American opt-in statutes apply in the specialized context of
workplace litigation. Cases brought under these laws typically involve
only a small number of plaintiffs; the class members have many
68. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2000) (establishing
the opt-in requirement for ADEA).
69. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000) (establishing the opt-in
requirement for FLSA).
70. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000) (establishing that the EPA is subject to
the opt-in provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)).
71. See, e.g., Su v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 6:05-cv-131-Orl-28JGG, 2006 WL 4792780, at *1
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2006) (finding 76 members out of 110 members in the class joined FLSA class
action); Lenahan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Civ. No. 02-0045, 2006 WL 2085282, at *13 (D.N.J.
July 24, 2006) (finding 7500 of 16,252 class members joined FLSA class action).
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opportunities to communicate with one another about the litigation,
both at the workplace and via electronic means such as the Internet;
and the amounts recovered are often substantial. All these factors
tend to increase participation rates. Where these factors are absent-
as in the typical consumer case, where class members have nothing in
common other than that they all purchased a particular product-
participation rates can be expected to be considerably lower.
An even closer American analogue to European opt-in
procedures might be found in class action settlements. U.S. class
action cases often settle, and when they do, class members who have
not opted out are usually required to submit claim forms establishing
their entitlement to relief. If they do not file claims they get nothing.
The claiming process after settlement of an opt-out case is thus
functionally similar to the opt-in process under European statutes. If
anything, in fact, the incentive to claim, post-settlement, is greater in
opt-out cases than in opt-in cases; failing to file a claim forfeits all
right to recovery, whereas failing to opt in only forfeits the right to
participate in the action before the court.
Claim rates depend on factors such as the size of per capita
recovery, the extent of the notice program, the ease of filing a claim,
and the degree of outreach undertaken by class counsel. Overall,
however, the American experience is mixed. Cox and Thomas studied
claiming rates in securities cases and found that even highly
sophisticated institutional investors often fail to claim the settlement
benefits. Less than thirty percent of the institutional investors with
demonstrated entitlement to relief filed claims, even though failing to
do so left billions of dollars on the table. 72 This study, moreover, dealt
with securities cases with sophisticated parties and significant
amounts at stake. Claiming rates in consumer cases are often even
lower-not a surprising fact given that the parties are less
sophisticated and the recoveries tend to be small. Some documented
consumer claim rates have been in the single digits, and in one case
not a single class member filed a claim, even though the class
consisted of more than a million people. 73
Based on this experience, what levels of participation can be
expected in European opt-in cases? An important factor here will be
the scope of consumer organization standing. If the scope of
72. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers:
Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate
in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 412 (2005).
73. Nienaber v. Citibank (South Dakota) N.A., No. Civ. 04-4054, 2007 WL 752297, at *2
(D.S.D. Mar. 7, 2007).
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representation is limited to the organization's members, opt-in rates
can be anticipated to be relatively high, because by joining an
organization, people signal their willingness to participate in its
activities. Moreover, it might be possible, under the law of some
jurisdictions, for the consumer organizations to obtain advance
agreements from their members to participate in all applicable class
action litigation brought by the organizations in the future. If such
agreements were respected, participation rates could come to resemble
the U.S. style opt-out procedure, although all the opt-ins would be
members of the organization. If the scope of representation extends
more broadly to all consumers damaged by the defendant's conduct,
however, opt-in rates are likely to be much lower, and probably in line
with U.S. experience for claiming rates in settlements.
Overall, for the opt-in process to render effective relief, it will
be crucial for jurisdictions implementing it to provide effective means
for participation. For example, such means could take the form of
clear notice (ideally, in consumer cases, including telephone
information lines and web pages as well as written notice); cheap and
easy opt-in forms (again including web-based sign-up mechanisms);
and outreach by the representative plaintiff coupled with suitable
incentives for that party to maximize participation rates.
3. Insufficient Finality
Let's turn now to the question of whether opt-in procedures can
accomplish global peace (global, that is, in the small world of a
consumer dispute). U.S. experience indicates that defendants desire to
extinguish all liability when they settle a class action. That desire is
expressed in clauses, demanded by defendants, which declare the
entire agreement to be null and void if more than a specified number
of plaintiffs opt out of the litigation. The goal of global peace also
indirectly benefits members of the class because defendants will pay
more for settlements that offer assurances against future litigation.
Compared with opt-out procedures, the opt-in requirement
offers significantly less assurances against continued litigation. In an
opt-out environment, anyone who doesn't exclude himself is bound by
the outcome and cannot participate in future litigation within the
scope of the release or judgment. In an opt-in environment, only those
who affirmatively join the litigation are bound by the outcome;
everyone else is free to bring additional lawsuits. The defendant
obtains no protection against these claims. Moreover, the threat of
additional lawsuits is not merely theoretical. If only a small
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percentage of the class opts in to a class action, it may be possible for
another class action to be brought on behalf of those who did not opt
in. 74 This problem with lack of global peace is illustrated in the
current Deutsch Telekom litigation in Germany. Should Deutsch
Telekom lose on a determination of liability, there would still be
16,000 pending cases without an organizational vehicle for an efficient
collective resolution. 75
It would appear possible, even within the constraints of an opt-
in procedure, to implement rules that provide protections against
future litigation similar to those that can be obtained in an opt-out
regime. Jurisdictions could provide that class members who do not opt
in are free to bring later individual actions but cannot thereafter
participate in other class actions. A rule that allows only one
opportunity to participate in a class action would accomplish effective
global peace. Although class members who do not opt in can bring
later individual actions, few will do so because it is not economically
viable to litigate consumer cases on an individual basis.
4. Deterrence
Finally, let's consider the deterrent effect of opt-out and opt-in
procedures. Here, the opt-out approach offers advantages, although
these are not always realized in actual cases. With an opt-out
procedure, the class consists of everyone who has not opted out, which
will be the vast majority of class members given consumer inertia. To
persuade a court that a settlement is "fair, reasonable, and
adequate,"76 therefore, the plaintiffs' attorney must argue that the
benefits of the litigation are sufficient for everyone who remains in the
class. With an opt-in procedure, in contrast, the settlement need only
provide benefits that are adequate for the (usually much smaller) set
of plaintiffs who have joined the litigation. Therefore, as a general
matter, opt-out procedures offer better deterrence because they impose
on the defendant more of the social cost of the defendant's wrongful
behavior.
However, here as elsewhere, the analysis is not quite that
simple. Attorneys in U.S. cases have found ways to make class action
settlements resemble outcomes under an opt-in rule. When a common
fund is created, some settlements contain "reverter" clauses providing
74. Defendants apparently prefer the opt-in rule, notwithstanding its impact on their
ability to obtain a comprehensive settlement, because of the substantially lower damages they
expect to pay under this procedure, a point we address below.
75. See supra note 7.
76. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2).
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that any amounts not claimed revert to the defendant. 77 Reverter
settlements are no longer seen in securities class actions, 78 but
reverters are occasionally found in other contexts. Much more common
these days is the consumer class action settlement where the
defendant promises to provide relief in a defined amount to every class
member who files a claim. These settlements, as a practical matter,
are similar to settlements under opt-in class actions because the
defendant ends up having to pay out only to those class members who
file claims-usually only a fraction of the class.
It might be possible, under European systems, to combine an
opt-in procedure with the assessment of damages to the entire class,
thus achieving better deterrence. Courts could order undifferentiated
relief for classes and apportion it on a pro rata basis to class members
who opt in and claim. This is the way many class action settlements
are handled in the United States. The settlement administrator holds
the claim forms until the claim period has expired and then
distributes the settlement proceeds to the claiming members in
proportion to their claims. Alternatively, claims administrators pay
out proven claims as they come in and then make a second
distribution of unclaimed amounts to class members who have filed
claims. If distribution to claiming class members is considered
problematic because some would receive more than their actual
damages, jurisdictions could consider alternative recipients of the
excess damages, such as escheats to the government. Strategies such
as these, if permissible under governing law, could go far towards
improving the deterrent effect of opt-in class actions.
III. CONCLUSION
At bottom, the gulf between the European and American
developments in class actions and other forms of aggregation reflects a
deeper divide than doctrines and formal laws alone would reveal. For
the civil law countries of continental Europe, the resistance to
77. See Geoffrey P. Miller & Lori S. Singer, Nonpecuniary Class Action Settlements, 60 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 106 (Autumn 1997) (examining reverter clauses). Reverter clauses offer
the benefit that they may be valued, for purposes of calculating percentage attorneys' fees, as if
the entire benefit had gone to the class, even though the defendant expects to receive some of the
settlement consideration back. See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 481-82 (1980)
(ruling that class counsel attorneys' fees may be calculated based on the total funds potentially
available for relief rather than the actual payout).
78. This is probably due to the fact that the PSLRA requires that percentage fees be based
on the amount of any damages "actually paid to the class." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(6) (2000). This
provision reverses the presumption in Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert that fees can be based on the
full amount that would be paid if all class members filed claims. 444 U.S. at 481-82.
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collectivist measures of adjudication is in part a continuation of what
Hayek has termed a "constructivist rationalism"-a deep-seated belief
in the importance of rationalist expertise in top-down administrative
decisionmaking. 79 What characterizes the American legal tradition-
what Hayek in turn would term "spontaneous order"80-is the common
law attachment to the bottom-up competitive evolution of legal rules. 8 1
One need not fully endorse Hayek's further claim about the inherent
superiority of the less intrusive forms of common law regulation 2 to
recognize that class actions allow non-state actors to assume the
collective responsibility that civil law systems have traditionally
reserved exclusively for the state.
Thus, when the evolving laws of aggregate procedure in the
United States and Europe are held up for comparison, what seems to
jump out is a core question: Who will organize, fund, and lead the
collective efforts? We focus on these issues to highlight our-
admittedly American-reaction to the emerging trends in Europe.
Both the strengths and the weaknesses of American collective
procedures arise from the willingness to entrust a great deal of social
regulation to private initiative and common law forms of adjudication.
Once unleashed in the United States, private actors found ways to
harness aggregative procedural devices, most notably class actions, to
create powerful litigation tools and, by extension, a new source of
common law decisionmaking. The evolving European law attempts to
realize some of the benefits of collective dispute resolution, but it is
conspicuously limited in its conception of how these processes will be
realized. From the American vantage point, we look at the European
experiments with a concern that law without the institutional
framework for its enforcement is necessarily lacking.
At the end of the day, it is all well and good to lay down
railroad track and invest in a stock of modern trains. But someone has
to drive the train. The United States has a creaky rail network and
trains that are the envy of no one. Compared to the rail systems of
Europe, it is difficult to believe that a wealthy country cannot connect
79. The term itself is formulated in 1 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND
LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 95 (1973). Hayek attributed this view to a Cartesian belief that all
advances in human society and knowledge were the product of reasoned design. Id. at 10-12.
80. Id. at 118-22.
81. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 275-76 (2003)
(analogizing Hayek's "spontaneous order" theory to Darwin's theory of natural selection).
82. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right,
30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 504 (2001) ("[Friedrich Hayek] argues vigorously that the English legal
tradition (the common law) is superior to the French (the civil law), not because of substantive
differences in legal rules, but because of differing assumptions about the roles of the individual
and the State.").
210 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol.62:1:179
its major cities efficiently. But, in our legal analogue, we do have
trained engineers quite willing to drive class action cases forward.
This may not be much; it may not be sufficient; it may at times prove
problematic; but it may also prove to be necessary.
